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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Russell P. Gremel*
Firearms Identification Held Outside of Defendant's Presence-In Goodall v.
U.S., 180 F.. 2d 397 (1950), the defendant appealed from a verdict against
him on the grounds that a firearms identification expert who testified at
his trial conducted some scientific tests outside of the defendant's presence
while the trial was'in progress. This contention was based on the right
given a defendant in a criminal proceeding to be present at every stage
of the trial. The court disposed of this argument by holding that the test
was not part of the trial and hence did not violate any of the defendant's
rights. This is in-line with earlier Federal decisions which have held that
the results of experiments made outside the courtroom are admissible as
evidence in criminal trials, and the court in the instant case found no reason
to distinguish the present situation merely because the tests were made
during the course'of the trial rather than prior to it.
Drunkometer Test Given Before Booking Held Not to Violate Due ProcessIn Wi7lenar v. State, 91 N.E. 2d 178, (Ind., 1950) the defendant was charged
with driving a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence
of liquor. He had been arrested by officers and had submitted to a drunkometer test prior to being taken before an examining magistrate. Defendant
claimed that any evidence obtained during his illegal detention was inadmissible, even though he had voluntarily submitted to the test. The Indiana
Supreme Court denied his contention, stating that the fact of unlawful
detention is not controlling, but only a factor to be considered in deciding
whether the evidence should be admitted. The Court held that the United
States Supreme Court case of Watts v. Indiana, cited by the defendant, did
not contain any language which would warrant the interpretation that a
confession secured during a period of unlawful detention would be inadmissible as a matter of law under the federal due process clause. (For an analysis
of Watts v. State and related cases, see Inbau, Legal Pitfalls to Avoid in
Criminal Interrogation, Vol. 40, page 211, of this Journal.)
Indentification of Parties Through a Telephone Conversation-In Benson v.
Commonwealth, 58 S.E. 2d 312 (Va., 1950) the prosecution alleged that the
defendant was engaged in the numbers racket and had paid protection
money to twenty-three officers of the local police force. One of the witnesses,
a former police officer, testified for the state that he had obtained a telephone
number from someone and was told that it belonged to the defendant. The
witness was unable to recall who it was who gave him the number, or what
the number was. He testified, however, that when he called this number
the party on the other end of the line identified himself as the defendant, and
that the ensuing conversation amounted to a confession of bribery on the
part of the defendant. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that this testimony was inadmissible on the grounds that when such a call is placed it is
necessary that the identity of the telephone be definitely established. Thus
it was required that the witness secure the number from the telephone book,
or at least verify it therein, before the Court would admit evidence as to
the conversation.
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Confessions Obtained During a Period of Unnecessary Delay Between Arre.
and Preliminary Hearing-Holding Suspect as a "Material Witness"--I!
People v. Perez, 300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E. 2d 40 (1950) certiorari denied, 7.
S. Ct. 483 (1950), the defendant was apprehended while attempting t.,
pawn a fur coat belonging to the victim of a burglary-murder. After first
telling the police that a stranger had given him the coat, as well as other
articles belonging to the deceased which he pawned elsewhere, the defendant
changed his story by naming a certain person as the one from whom he received the articles. After being confronted with this person's denial, defendant named still another person whom the police could not locate at the place
designated by the defendant. After about twenty-four hours of fruitless
questioning by thirteen detectives the defendant was brought into court
and committed to jail as a material witness in default of a $50,000 bail.
(New York has a statute authorizing material witness commitment.) For
several days thereafter the defendant was interrogated about the burglarymurder and when he finally confessed he was formally charged with the
crime of first degree murder.
Defendant objected to the admissibility of the confession, alleging that
it had been extorted from him by physical abuse on the part of his police
interrogators. He also requested an instruction from the court to the
effect that the jury might consider his detention an unnecessary delay
in arraignment and as a factor bearing on the issue of the voluntariness
of the confession. (Under a previous New York ruling, an unnecessary
delay in arraignment is subject to such consideration.) The requested
instruction was denied and the trial court's ruling was upheld in a 5-2
decision by the New York Court of Appeals. The majority of the court
held that the defendant's detention was neither unlawful nor unnecessarythat his possession of the victim's property and his explanation that he
received it from another person properly warranted holding him as a
material witness under the New York material witness statute. That being
so, there was no violation of the other New York statute requiring prompt
arraignment of accused persons.
The two dissenting judges were of the opinion that the requested instruction should have been given. They pointed out the fact that the defendant
had been held for twenty-four hours before being committed as a material
witness. They- also expressed the view that "it is a strange doctrine that
a material-witness commitment, intended only to guarantee the presence
of a witness at the trial, takes away from the 'witness' all protection against
third-degree questioning, as a suspect . . ."

The dissenting opinion also

stated: "If this simple device, of treating an arrested person as a 'material
witness,' legalizes any subsequent period of otherwise unlawful detention,
it will indeed be a useful one for those who are impatient of the curbs of
[the prompt arraignment statute]."
The Advisability of Photographing a Confessed Criminal Immediately After
His Confession-In the foregoing Perez case, the majority of the New York
Court of Appeals were very much impressed with the photograph of the
defendant, taken shortly after his confession which showed him "in a
smiling and completely self-possessed pose," and which belied the defendant's contention that he had been severely abused by the police. The
usefulness of photographs for this purpose should not be overlooked by
criminal investigators.
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